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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DORA BURTON, 
Plaintiff and Res-pondent, 
vs. 
J. H. McLAUGHLIN, Administrator 
of the Estate of Patrick Henry 
McLaughlin, deceased, 
Defendant and App,ellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 7392 
A. STATEMENT OF THE F'ACTS 
Appellant will designate the parties as plaintiff and 
defendant. 
All italics a:ppearing in the brief are added. 
Patrick Henry McLaughlin died on the 17th day of 
May, 1948 and at the time of his death he was a retired 
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railroad employee receiving regular monthly retirement 
pay. He owned his own home located at 756 West 2nd 
South Street, in Salt Lake ·City, Utah. At the rear of 
his home was :a very small home which he rented to Jesus 
Nonas and the plaintiff at a monthly rental of $12.00. 
Patrick Henry McLaughlin vva.s survived by a wife 
and eight children. His son, James H. McLaughlin, 
was appointed administrator of his father's estate. The 
·plaintiff presented the administrator with a claim where-
in she claimed $930.00 ''for personal services rendered 
deceased from about October 1, 1945 to I\1:ay 17, 1948. '' 
The said claim was disallowed by defendant adminis-
trator and the plaintiff brought the above entitled action, 
which is based on an alleged oral contract of employment, 
and alleged that from about October 1, 1945 to May 17, 
1948 plaintiff rendered to deceased services of a reason-
able value of $930.00, for which she alleges she received 
no payment. By plaintiff's Bill of Particulars (R. 14 
and 15) plaintiff all·eges that she rendered the following 
serVIces: 
"That from about October 1, 1945 until the 
death of the said Patrick Henry McLaughlin on or 
about May 17, 1948, he w-as sick most of the time, 
was weak, nervous and confined to his bed; that 
he only got up occasionally, and when he did 
it was difficult for him to walk alone, and on said 
occasions, plaintiff assisted him to get to and 
from the lavatory to shave, and even get over to 
a chair to sit down. 
''During the entire period of time alleged, 
plaintiff made his breakfast almost every morning, 
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and during the fall and 'vin ter months, she ea1ne 
into his house and made the fire every n1orning, 
heated "~ater for him to wash, and made his bed 
daily. . She kept the fire alive during the day, 
and late in the night until she retired, so that 
he w .. ould not freeze to death. During the entire 
period of time, above stated, she washed and 
ironed his clothing, mended his clothes, stockings, 
etc. About once a \Yeek at his request, she bathed 
him because he was unable to do so himself. -On 
one particular occasion during the winter of 1947-
1948, the water pipes froze and she had to go out 
and get a plumber, and have the pipes fixed. 
'' She paid his miscellaneous bills such as light, 
water bills, taxes, etc. from money which he gave 
her most every month from his monthly pension 
check. She also purchased all of his food and some 
comforts of life which he requested, for which he 
always gave her money. She cooked most of his 
dinners, and prepared most of his luncheons dur-
ing this entire period of time. Every year she 
cleaned the woodwork in the spring and in the 
fall; she swept out the house every few days to 
make it at least partially liveable. 
''On special holidays, such as ~Christmas, 
Thanksgiving, Easter, etc., she would cook him a 
special dinner on her own stove and bring it to 
him, and feed it to him as he was alone. All of 
the above mentioned services were rendered by 
the plaintiff at the .request of Patrick Henry 
McLaughlin during his lifetime and upon his 
promise to her repeatedly made, that he would 
compensate her for her services rendered.'' 
The testimony of the plaintiff and defendant con-
flicts as to whether deceased needed the services which 
plaintiff claimed she rendered to deceased, also as to 
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whether she rendered service to deceased. There is no 
evidence that deceased requested any service, except on 
one or two occasions when 1>laintiff was going to the 
store deceased asked her to make small purchases of 
groceries for him for which he gave her the money. 
James McLaughlin testified that his father, Patrick 
Henry McLaughlin, was a retired railroad crossing 
watchman and that he received a pension (railroad re-
tirement pay) (R. 89); that within the three years prior 
to his death he was possessed of stocks and bonds ( R. 89) ; 
that witness visited his father frequently, about twice 
a month over the past three years (R. 89-90), and that 
his father was able to and did care for himself "up_until 
the last three or four days before he died" (R. 90) _; that 
witness never saw Mrs. Burton render any services for 
his father; that his father cooked all of his own meals and 
did his own cleaning. For a period of four months (De-
cember, 1947, and January, February and March, 1948) 
prior to decedent's death in May of 1948, a crossing 
watchman and his forty-five or fifty year old wife lived 
in the home with Patrick Henry McLaughlin and that the 
said woman did the cleaning :and cooking and housekeep: 
ing during this period; that the crossing watchman died 
in McLaughlin's home about a month before McLaughlin 
died (R. 137-139); that McLaughlin was around town 
and purchased a liquor permit A!)·ril 19, 1948 (R. 139) 
(Exhibit R. 177); that the P·atrick Henry McLaughlin 
home was filthy dirty and there was no evidence that 
plain tiff ever cleaned the said home ( R. 131, 136, 146, 
149 and 152). 
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There is no evidence of any continued service to 
defendant as claimed by the plaintiff; there are only 
fragments of testimony indicating that prior to two 
months before the death of the deceased that the plaintiff 
had done anything for or on behalf of the defendant. 
Such testimony was so inconsistent as to be of no value. 
For example, Mrs. Jenkins testified that on one occasion 
she saw plaintiff take a tray of food to Mr. McLaugh-
lin's house and that she also saw her take some kindling 
wood to Mr. McLaughlin's house; that she (Mrs. Jenkins) 
had never been inside of Mr. McLaughlin's house (R. 5Q). 
Hyrum Silver testified that he smelled food cooking on 
several occasions within about a year's time ·prior to 
the death of Mr. McLaughlin (R. 72). 
There is no definite testimony as to any ascertain-
able amount of services rendered; there is no evidence 
as to the value of services rendered; there is no evidence 
of any promise by deceased, Patrick Henry McLaughlin, 
to pay for any services, and there is no evidence of de-
mand for payment for services having been made prior 
to the death of Mr. McLaughlin. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS UPON WHICH AP-
PELLANT RELIES FOR A REVERSAL OF THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BELOW: 
P·OINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIO·N FOR A NONSUIT. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT MADE ITS FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND AWARDED JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF WHOLLY FAIL-
ED TO PROVE ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF 
AND DECEASED AS ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF, AND 
PLAINTIFF WHO·LLY FAILED TO PRO·VE THAT SHE 
RENDERED SERVICES TO DECEASED AS ALLEGED BY 
PLAINTIFF. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO: PROVE THAT SHE 
EVER DEMANDED PAYMENT FOR SERVICES ALLEGED-
LY RENDERED DECEASED DURING THE LIFETIME OF 
DECEASED. THERE IS NO PROOF OF NON-PAYMENT 
FOR SERVICES ALLEGEDLY RENDERED TO DECEASED 
BY PLAINTIFF. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE UPON WHICH 
THE CO·URT COULD FIX THE VALUE OF SERVICES IN 
THE AMO:UNT AS FOUND AND DECREED BY THE COURT, 
OR IN ANY OTHER AMOUNT . 
. POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING O·VER DEFEND-
ANT'S O:BJECTION RAYMOND R. BRADY'S TESTIMO·NY 
PERTAINING TO MATTERS AND CONVERSATIONS HAD 
BETWEEN PATRICK HENRY McLAUGHLIN AND HIS AT-
TORNEY, MR. BRADY, SUCH MATTERS AND CONVER-
SATIONS BEING CONFIDENTIAL AS BETWEEN ATTO-R-
NEY AND CLIENT. 
ARGUMENT 
Points of Error I and II will be argued together as 
they both refer to plaintiff's failure to prove the facts 
as alleged; failure to prove a contract, expressed or 
implied, for services; failure to prove value of services; 
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and failure to ·prove non-payment for services alleged 
to have been rendered. 
By plaintiff's Bill of Particulars (R. 14) plaintiff 
alleges "that from October 1, 1945 until the death of 
P:atrick Henry McLaughlin on May 17, 1948, he was sick 
most of the time, was weak, nervous and confined to his 
bed; he only got up occasionally, and when he did he was 
so weak it was difficult for him to walk alone, and on 
said occasions, plaintiff assisted him to get to and from 
the lavatory, to shave, and even get over to a chair to 
sit down.'' 
There is absolutely no evidence to support these 
allegations that McLaughlin was sick and incapacitated 
except for not to exceed two months prior to his death. 
The only evidence of his incapacity was the testimony 
of Mr. Brady and his testimony pertained only to th·e 
months of March, April and about fifteen days in May 
prior to McLaughlin's death, about twenty-five visits 
in all (R. 105), and he does not state that McLaughlin 
was incapacitated until about t~o weeks prior to his 
death. On the contrary, deceased's son, James ~cLaugh­
lin, testified that McLaughlin was not inca~pacitated and 
that he cared for himself up until three or four days 
prior to his death (R. 135). Also defendant's Exhibit 
2, which is a "Utah Liquor ·Control Commission Indi-
vidual Liquor Permit", issued only to the party named 
therein, :and which is signed by Mr. ·McLaughlin (R. 139), 
discloses positive evidence that he was u~p and around 
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town on Aprill9, 1948, which was less than a month prior 
to his death. 
Plaintiff by her Bill of Particulars (R. 14) alleges: 
''During the entire period of time alleged, 
plaintiff made his breakfast almost ·every morning, 
and during the fall and winter months, she came 
into his house and made the fire every morning, 
heated water for him to wash, and made his bed 
-daily. She kept the fire alive during the day, and 
late in the night until she retired, so that he would 
not freeze to death. During the entire period of 
time, above stated, she washed and ironed his 
clothing, mended his clothes, stockings, etc. About 
once a week at his request, she bathed him because 
he was unable to do so himself. On one particular 
occasion during the winter of 1947-1948, the water 
pipes froze and she had to go out and get a 
plumber, and hav~ the pipes fixed." 
There are only fragments of testimony that plaintiff 
cooked breakfast for McLaughlin, except possibly the 
last two or three weeks prior to his death. The evidence 
is that he cooked his own meals until December, 1947 
(R. 90) and that during the months of December, 1947, 
J·anuary, February and March, 1948, a certain lady 
cooked his meals (R. 135 and 138). There is absolutely 
no evidence that plaintiff made a fire every morning 
or that she did any of the other things alleged in the 
above quoted paragraph, except that on one occasion 
just p·rior to Mr. McLaughlin's death Mr. B~ady did 
testify that he saw her/ bathe Mr. McLaughlin. 
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By plaintiff's Bill of Particulars (R. 14), plaintiff 
alleges: 
''She paid his miscellaneous bills such as light, 
water bills, taxes, etc. from money which he gave 
her most every month from his monthly p~ension 
check. She also purchased all of his food and some 
comforts of life which he requested, for which he 
al\vays gave her money. She cooked most of his 
dinners, and prepared most of his luncheons dur-
ing this entire period of time. Every year she 
cleaned the woodwork in the spring and in the 
fall; she swept out the house every few days to 
make it at least partially liveable." 
There is no evidence to support these allegations, 
or any of them, except that on one or two occasions, over 
a period of one and one-half years she was seen to carry 
a tray of food from her house to McLaughlin's house 
and on one or two -occasions 1she went to the grocery 
store for McLaughlin. ·The fact that the plaintiff did 
not clean the house and that it was filthy dirty is ~proven 
by the witnesses, Mr. Brady who testified as follows 
(R. 131): 
''Q. Ray, the house was a pretty dirty place, 
wasn't it~ 
A. Yes, it was, it was terribly dirty. 
Q. It was filthy~ 
A. It was filthy. 
Q. The blankets were dirty~ 
A. Yes, the blankets were dirty. 
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The linen-pillow slips-was just filthy? 
Tha-t's right, it was a terrible situation. 
And the floor was dirty and greasy and-
Yes it was, Mr. Wallace. 
Dust on the furniture~ 
Yes, Mr. Wallace, it was a pitiful situ-
ation. 
Q . It was really a filthy dirty layout, wasn't 
. t Dl 1 • 
A. Yes sir it was. * * * " 
and Mr. James McLaughlin, who testified as follows 
(R. 13'6, 137) : 
''Q. Was the house kept clean and tidy? 
A. No it wasn't. 
Q. What was the condition of the house? 
A. It was in terrible condition; it was filthy. 
Q. Was it swept 1 
A. No. 
Q. Was the woodwork kept clean~ 
A. No it wasn't. 
Q. Was there any evidence of any house-
cleaning having been done there f 
A. No there wasn't. 
Q. By anybody 1 
A. No." 
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Kathleen Ruddy testified (R. 151-153) that she 
visited the McLaughlin house five or six times and that 
the hous·e and bedding was very dirty and bore no 
evidence of having been cleaned e?Ccept when she cleaned 
it. 
'' Q. On any of those occasions when you 
would visit there was there any evidence of any 
housework having been done~ 
A. Never except when I did it.'' 
Theodore Simpson testified (R. 146) : 
''Did you go to the home after his (meaning 
McLaughlin's) death~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What was the condition of the home~ 
A. It was terrible, the same as previously, 
1n fact. 
Q. Bedding, and so forth, do you know what 
was done with that~ 
A. Yes sir; it was filthy, and we just dumped 
it on the floor; we wouldn't even touch it. It was 
that dirty and filthy. 
Q. It was taken out and burned~ 
A. Yes sir." 
Plaintiff further alleges by her Bill of Particulars 
(R. 15): 
''On special holidays, such as Christmas, 
Thanksgiving, Easter, etc., she would cook him a 
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special dinner on her own stove and bring it to 
him, and feed it to him as he was alone. All of the 
above mentioned services were rendered by the 
plaintiff at the request of Patrick Henry McLaugh-
lin during his lifetime and upon his promise to 
her repeatedly made, that he would compensate 
her for her services rendered.'' 
There is absolutely no evidence to support any one 
of these allegations; there is no evidence that McLaughlin 
requested any -services from the plaintiff or that deceased 
repeatedly or ever promised plaintiff ''that he would 
comp~ensate her for her services rendered''; there is no 
evidence of any service for hire, and any services, as 
shown by fragments of testimony, :a.re only such service 
as one good neighbor would render to another without 
expectation of remuneration. The statement of Mr. 
McLaughlin shows that he considered any kindness 
shown to him by plaintiff as mere gratuities. 
Mr. Bullough testified (R. 64, 65) : 
"Q. Just state what he said, 1n substance, 
as you remember it. 
A. Then I will put it this way: He wanted 
me to make a statement to him before he would 
sign that deed and transfer that property, that I 
would give consideration to Dora Burton, that 
she would be allowed to remain in the house. At 
the time I raised the question, I wanted some 
stipulation of time because, if I so needed that 
'P~roperty, then I didn't want to be bound by a 
moral obligation, so I suggested that it would be 
at least six months before I would have any use 
for the back part of the property where the house 
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"~as, and, for that time, she could remain there, 
and that, after we did find occasion where we 
needed the room, the space where the little house 
was, that I would then give her ample time and 
consideration in finding another place to live. 
Q. Did Mr. McLaughlin make any response 
to that assurance that you gave him~ 
A. When I told him that I would, that he 
had felt I would give her six months or more and 
would furnish her due consideration to find a place 
to live before I would :ask her to vacate, under 
that condition he was willing to sign that deed. 
That was part of the condition of him signing 
that deed.'' 
It cannot he determined from the evidence the 
amount or value of the services, if any, rendered. Plain-
tiff testified that she had on other jobs received 75 cents 
per hour for gener:al housework and $1.00 per hour for 
cleaning woodwork, windows and curtains. This is the 
only evidence of any value of services and is unrelated 
to any other evidence in this case, and it cannot by any 
stretch of the imagination be applied to the fragmentary 
evidence introduced in this case to determine that plain-
tiff·· rendered to McLaughlin services of the value of 
$930.00 or of any other determinable value. 
To be entitled to judgment against the estate of a 
deceased person, whe~e the lips of the principal witness 
are sealed by death, the court will scrutinize the evidence 
with particular care and ''unless (as the Sup.reme Court 
of Utah declares in the case of Van N atts vs. Heywood, 
et al, 57 Utah, at p·age 381) under the circumstances 
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·the proof is positive and clear and convincing, the relief 
sought should and will be denied.'' 
In the case at bar more than three years passed 
during Mr. McLaughlin's lifetime and no demand for 
payment was ever made upon him during his lifetime. 
In the case of Ratliff v. Sadler, et .al, 299 P. 674, 
at the bottom of page 676 the court says: 
''But where a claim for services or board is 
first made after the decease of the alleged debtor, 
the presumption obtains that payment was made 
or that it was not intended to demand payment, 
and evidence to establish a claim for services 
-against a decedent's estate not made during his 
lifetime, must be other than mere loose declara-
tions and must clearly and distinctly establish a 
contract between claimant and decedent." 
The true rule of law applicable to this case is ex-
pressed in 24 ·Corpus Juris 279 as follows: 
'·'·Compensation cannot be allowed for services 
which were p~erformed without any claim for pay-
ment during decedent's lifetime, or -any expecta-
tion of being paid specifically therefor, and with-
out any ·express or implied promise of remunera-
tion, even though their performance may have 
been prompted by the hope of obtaining a gift 
or legacy which has not been fulfilled ; and a 
direction on the part of decedent to his executors 
to pay for services voluntarily rendered to deced-
ent will not create a claim against the estate, nor 
will the expression by decedent of intention to 
pay therefor have this effect." 
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Plaintiff evidently bases her claim for services on 
an hourly wage of 75 cents or $1.00 per hour (R. 123-6) .. 
It cannot be determin·ed how many hours she claims to 
have w··orked. It is disclosed by the evidence that 
McLaughlin ""'as possessed with bonds and stocks p·rior 
to his death and that he received monthly retirement 
pay as a retired railroad employee (R. 89). Therefore, 
the proof shows that he ""'as able to pay for services. 
It would not be natural for a person working· by the 
hour to work from October 1, 1945 to May 17, 1948 with-
out being paid or without even demanding pay for her 
services. The presumption under thes·e circumstances 
is that she was either paid or that no pay was exp·ected 
or payable to her. 
• In Hoefner v. Franklin Trust Co., 24 A. (2d) 457, 
147 Pa. Super, 404 (Penn. 1942) the court said: 
''In determining whether a claimant for wages 
alleged to be due for domestic services and nurs-
ing furnished decedent discharged the burden of 
}}roof, record is to be reviewed with greatest 
suspicion, all doubts as to sufficiency of evidence 
are to be resolved in favor of estate. The pre-
sumption grows stronger as each period of pay-
ment goes by. In the nature of things, it is less 
potent against a claim for two or three months 
wages than for two or three years; and again its 
strength is increased or diminished by other cir-
cumstances that, in the usual experiences of life, 
make payment more probable, or explain the 
delay. And the evidence to sustain the claim must 
vary in the same ratio. As was said by our late 
brother Clark in Gregory v. Com. 121 Pa. 611, 
15 A. 452. The presumption will gather strength 
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with each succeeding year, and evidence to over-
throw it must, of course, be correspondingly 
increased. '' 
In Bancroft Probate Practice, Vol. 3, page 1534, 
it is stated: 
''Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence Neces-
sary. 
"One of the most common of contested claims 
against the estate of a decedent is that for services 
rendered or supp·ort furnished to decedent in his 
lifetime, for which the decedent is said to have 
made some manner of vague promise of payment 
or re~ompense. The courts are, with reason, sus-
picious of this class of claims. It is frequently 
said that the facts urged in support of such a 
demand should be scrutinized with care, or that 
the claim must be supported by reliable and con-
vincing proof, or clear convincing-proof, or proof 
that is strong and convincing. 
''It has been declared that the test of suffi-
ciency of evidence to warrant a recovery on such 
a claim is higher than in ordinary actions.'' 
This s-ame rule has been held by our Supr.eme Court 
in the case of Patton v. Evans, 92 Utah 524, near the 
bottom of page 529 the court said : 
'' * * * While a bill for services alleged to have 
been rendered to an old person for a considerable 
time before· death without collecting on account 
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or without anything in writing to ~how the agree-
ment, or without showing that any demand had 
ever been made on the one cared for and what the 
outcome of that demand was should be carefully 
scrutinized before allowance by the executor.* * * '' 
In Anderson v. Distler, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 674, 173 
Misc. 261, the court stated : 
''The law does not imply a p·romise to pay for 
every volunteered service. General assumpsit 
cannot be based on a service rendered· through 
kindnes-s or other motive and not to be accounted 
for on a theory of an expectation of payment." 
In Hinkle v .. Sage, 65 N. E. 999, the court stated: 
''~Cases of this kind are odious and are not 
favored by the court because they afford an oppor-
tunity for fraud against the estates of deceased 
persons, and great temptation to perjury.'' 
In the case of In re Gutekunst Estate, 9 Som. 179, 
it is stated: 
''In order to establish a claim against the 
estate of a decedent the proofs must be direct 
and positive and the terms of the liability must 
be certain and definite.'' 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTIN·G OVER DEFEND-
ANT'S O·BJECTION RAYMOND R. BRADY'S TESTIMONY 
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PERTAINING TO MATTERS AND CO:NVERSATIONS HAD 
BE_TWEEN PATRICK HENRY McLAUGHLIN AND HIS AT-
TORNEY, MR. BRADY, SUCH MATTERS AND CONVERSA-
TIONS BEING CONFIDENTIAL AS BETWEEN ATTO·RNEY 
AND CLIENT. 
Mr. Brady was Mr. McLaughlin's attorney, prepared 
his will for him (R. 117) and the court, over defendant'a 
objection, permitted Mr. Brady to testify pertaining to 
matters and conversations which w·ere confidential as 
between attorney and client (R. 114-121). This was 
prejudicial error and in violation of the p·rovisions of 
Subsection 2 of Sec. 104-49-3, Utah ·Code Annotated, 1943, 
which provides as follows: 
''An attorney cannot, without the consent of 
his client, be examined as to any communication 
made by the client to him, or his advice given 
therein, in the course of professional employment; 
nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer or 
clerk be examined, without the consent of his· 
employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge of 
which had been acquired in such capacity.'' 
The conversation (R. 119-120) clearly shows the 
relationship of :attorney and client and the conversation 
admitted in evidence pertained to the preparation of a 
will and codicil, and as such was confidential and should 
not have been admitted in evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court 
erred when it denied the Motion for Nonsuit, :also when 
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it entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L·aw 
and Decree, as there was no evidence, or in any event 
insufficient evidence, upon which to base the Findings 
of Fact and Decree. The court further erred when it 
admitted in evidence the confidential conversations had 
between the deceased and his attorney. 
We therefore respectfully submit that the judgment 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK & ROBERTS, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant. 
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